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Male Headship: Reform of the Protestant Tradition 
 





The historical Protestant tradition has interpreted the biblical teachings on male 
headship in a variety of ways – from stern theories of patriarchy within the church, 
state, and family to gender-equality in all relationships. This Article uses a nineteenth-
century English literary debate between the patriarchal views of James Fitzjames 
Stephens and the egalitarian views of John Stuart Mill to test the values and limits of 
each perspective and their respective influence on modern family law.  
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Introduction 
Both the legal and the Protestant traditions of the West have offered multiple 
answers to the question whether Christianity teaches male headship.  The answers 
change as one moves from medieval Catholic canon law, to early modern civil law, to 
twentieth-century Anglo-American common law.  The answers change further as one 
moves across mainline Lutheran, Calvinist, Anglican, and Anabaptist traditions, and 
moves forward within each denomination from the sixteenth century until today.  And 
the answers change again as one moves through institutions of the household, the 
church, the state, and voluntary associations.  In broad historical outline, the 
theological presumption of male headship is stronger among Calvinists and Anglicans 
than among Lutherans and Anabaptists, and stronger among sixteenth and 
seventeenth century Protestants than among their modern successors.  Also in broad 
historical outline, the legal presumption of male headship has been more fully 
maintained within the household and the church, where group identity and rights are 
more heavily emphasized, than within the state and voluntary associations, where 
individual rights and equality have higher priority.   
Both the theology and the law of the Protestant traditions have had to steer a 
course between patriarchal monism and gender-blind egalitarianism.  Even the most 
rigid patriarchal models of headship have had to yield to the perennial realities of 
queenships, matriarchal associations, and single mother households.  Even the most 
rigorous expositions of gender equality have had to acknowledge the distinct callings 
and capacities of males and females in the processes of procreation, nurture, and 
education of children.  An emerging theme of the Western Protestant tradition has thus 
been to emphasize the ontological equality of males and females before God, even 
while differentiating, and sometimes chauvinistically prioritizing, their respective 
callings and offices.  An emerging theme of the Western legal tradition, has been to 
emphasize the constitutional equality of men and women, even while allowing 
churches, households, and other non-state associations to strike their own internal 
balances between headship and equality, authority and liberty.   
James Fitzjames Stephen v. John Stuart Mill 
Rather than tracking this moving picture of male headship with anecdotes, 
permit me to summarize a vigorous literary debate about male headship within 
marriage in mid-nineteenth century England.  The antagonists in the debate were 
James Fitzjames Stephen, a prominent Anglican jurist and moralist, and John Stuart 
Mill, a leading libertarian and utilitarian.  Both were distinguished men of letters and 
occasional legislators.  Both spoke for broad constituencies--Stephen for an old 
Protestant order featuring marital headship, Mill for a new libertarian order featuring 
gender equality.   
The setting for much of their debate was the ferment in Parliament for the 
reform of the traditional English law of marriage--ferment that found equal force in 
American state legislatures at the same time.  The Stephen-Mill debate was focussed 
by several bills that sought to liberalize marriage and divorce rules, to liberate children 
from abusive households, and to enhance the rights of wives to their property and 
minor children.  For Stephen, the heart of the debate was over the essential character 
of marriage and the family: Is this institution "a divine, indissoluble union governed by 
the paterfamilias [at its head], or is it a contractual unit governed and dissolved by the 
wills of the parties?"  
Stephen, speaking for the old order, defended the first position.  "[T]he political 
and social changes which have taken place in the world since the sixteenth century 
[Protestant Reformation] have ... been eminently beneficial to mankind," Stephen 
wrote.  "The terms of the marriage relation as settled by the law and religion of Europe" 
since the Protestant Reformation must be maintained.   
The "settled" theological view of Stephen's day was that marriage is a "state of 
existence ordained by the Creator," "a consummation of the Divine command to 
multiply and replenish the earth," "the only stable substructure of social, civil, and 
religious institutions."  Marriage was almost universally taken to be a permanent 
monogamous union between a fit man and woman designed at once for mutual love 
and affection, mutual procreation and nurture of children, mutual protection from 
spiritual and civil harms. 
The "settled" legal view of Stephen's day was that marriage depended for its 
legitimacy on the absolute and unequivocal consent of both the woman and the man.  
Marriage formation required formal betrothals, publication of banns, parental consent, 
peer witnesses, church consecration, state consecration.  Marriages would be 
annulled, on petition of either party, if couples were related by various blood or family 
ties identified in the Mosaic law, or where one party proved impotent, frigid, sterile, or 
had a contagious disease that precluded procreation or endangered the other spouse.  
Marriages could also be annulled if one of the parties had been coerced, tricked, or 
misled into marriage. 
The "settled" natural view of Stephen's day was that men are created with 
superior power, ability, and opportunity in life, which they must discharge with due 
restraint and accountability to God.  Women have a special calling to be wives and 
mothers, teachers and nurturers of children, which calling they must discharge in the 
household.  Our law and religion reflect these natural sentiments, said Stephen, "by 
prescribing monogamy, indissoluble marriage on the footing of the obedience of the 
wife to the husband, and a division of labour among men and women with 
corresponding differences in the matters of conduct, manners, and dress."   
Nature is defied if marriage is treated as a simple contract, Stephen argued.  
This notion assumes falsely that men and women are equal.  To allow marriage to 
become "a simple bargained-for contract," without oversight by parents and peers and 
by church and state, "will inevitably expose women to great abuse."  They will have no 
protection in forming the bargain with naturally superior men, nor protection from men 
who dismiss them when barren, old, unattractive, troubled, or destitute.  "The truth is," 
Stephen thundered, "that the change of marriage ... from status to contract" "is not 
favorable to equality."  "Men [and women] are fundamentally unequal, and this 
inequality will show itself, arrange society [and its law] as you like."  "If marriage is to 
be permanent," and justice and liberty properly guarded, "the government of the family 
must be put by law and by morals in the hands of the husband."   
Nature is also defied if the family is treated as an open contractual society, 
subject to multiple claims of right by its members.  The family, once formed, is an 
independent institution that "lies at the foundation of both church and state."  The 
husband and father is the head of the family, just as the monarch is the head of church 
and state.  As paterfamilias, he must rule the household as God's vice-regent with all 
benevolence, grace, and Christian devotion.  A wife is the husband's co-helper in the 
family, a child his ward and agenda, both of whom must obey his every reasonable 
command.  
Stephen was well aware of the potential abuses in this traditional law.  "No one," 
he writes, "contends that a man ought to have power to order his wife and children 
about like slaves and beat them if they disobey him."  Such abusive conduct must be 
punished severely, but on a case-by-case basis.  
John Stuart Mill attacked Stephen's sentiments with arguments well known in 
England's liberal circles.  Mill's attack was, in part, directed against the abuses allowed 
by this traditional system of marriage and family law.  But Mill's deeper attack 
theological -- "laying bare the real root of much that is bowed down to as the intention 
of Nature and the ordinance of God."  The prevailing theology and law of marriage and 
the family supports a "three-fold patriarchy," Mill charged.  The church dictates to the 
state its peculiar understanding of nature.  The state dictates to the couple the terms of 
their marital relation, and abandons them once the terms are accepted.  The man lords 
over his wife and children, divesting them of all liberty and license in their person and 
property, thought and belief.  
Nature does not teach the headship of man or the subjection of women, said 
Mill, but "a perfect equality" of spouses.  "If marriage were an equal contract ... and if [a 
woman] would find all honourable employments as freely open to her as to men," 
marriages could be true institutions of liberty and affection, shaped by the preferences 
of wife and husband, not the prescriptions of church and state.  
Nature also does not teach tyranny and commodification of children by the 
paterfamilias.  Children are not items of property, to be sold on the market of marriage, 
or conduits through which to pass the family name and property.  Nor are children 
slaves to be worked and whipped into submission and performance by the 
paterfamilias.  If the family were an open unit, where children could seek redress from 
neglect, abuse and arbitrary rule, a real family could be realized and true happiness for 
all parties involved could be attained.  If the paterfamilias does not "fulfill his obligation 
to feed, nurture, and educate his child with love and patience," said Mill, the 
paterpoliticus, the state as the child's protector under the social contract, "ought to see 
it fulfilled, at the charge, as far as possible, of the parent." 
Legal Reforms 
Mill's critique anticipated many of the reforms of Anglo-American marriage law 
enacted over the past 150 years.  The reforms came in two waves.  The first wave, 
which broke slowly over England and America from the mid-nineteenth to the mid-
twentieth centuries, was designed to bring greater equality and equity to the traditional 
household, without necessarily denying the traditional Christian ideals of marriage that 
had helped to form this institution.  The second wave of reform, which has been 
breaking in America since the early 1960s, seems calculated to break the preeminence 
of the traditional family law, and the basic Christian values which once sustained it.  
The first wave of legal reforms brought greater protection to women and 
children.  New legislation released married women from the legal bonds of "coverture," 
which traditionally had subsumed a married woman's person and property into that of 
her husband.  A married woman could now hold independent title and control, and 
exercise independent contractual and testimonial rights, over the property she brought 
into the marriage or acquired thereafter.  She also gained the capacity to litigate in 
respect of her property, without intermeddling by her husband.  As their rights to 
property were enhanced, (married) women slowly gained broader rights to higher 
education, learned societies, trade and commercial guilds and unions, and various 
professions, occupations, and societies, and the franchise -- all of which had been 
largely closed to them.   
Other new legislation provided that, in cases of annulment or divorce, courts 
had discretion to place minor children in the custody of that parent who was best suited 
to care for them.  This reversed the traditional presumption that child custody belonged 
to the father.  The wife could now claim custody, particularly where children were of 
tender years or where the husband was found to be cruel, abusive, or unfit as a 
caretaker.  Courts retained the traditional power to order guilty husbands to pay 
alimony to innocent wives, and were newly empowered to make other "reasonable" 
allocations of marital property to the innocent wife for child support. 
These and other early reforms sought to improve traditional marriage lore and 
law more than to abandon it.  Most of these reformers, Mill among them, accepted the 
Christian ideal of marriage as a permanent union of a fit man and woman of the age of 
consent.  Most accepted the classic Augustinian definition of the marital goods of fides, 
proles, et sacramentum--sacrifical love, supportive procreation, and symbolic stability.  
The primary goal of these early reformers was to purge the household of the 
paternalism and patriarchy inherent in some traditional views of headship, and thus to 
render the ideals of marriage a greater reality for all.   
The legal reforms introduced during this first phase were designed to render 
marriages easier to contract, maintain, and dissolve.  Courts were more deferential to 
the wishes of both marital parties, before, during, and after their wedding.  Wives 
received greater protections from their husbands and greater independence in their 
relationships outside the household.  Children received greater protection from 
parental abuse and greater access to benefit rights.  Young women, in particular, 
received greater freedom to forgo or postpone marriage, and greater social, political, 
and economic opportunities, regardless of their marital status.  While traditionally, a 
woman's consent was considered essential only for purposes of marital formation, now 
it was becoming essential to all phases of the marital process.  While traditionally, 
male headship was considered the natural condition of a voluntarily formed marriage, it 
was increasingly viewed as a negotiable term, particularly if the woman or her family 
had ample political or economic power. 
It should be noted that this transformation of marital headship was as much as 
reformation as a rejection of basic Protestant lore.  One goal of the sixteenth century 
Protestant reformers had been to remove the cleric as a mediator between God and 
the laity--following St. Peter's teaching on the priesthood of all believers.  One 
consequence of embracing the principle of headship was to interpose the paterfamilias 
as a mediator between God and his wife--following St. Paul's teaching on household 
codes.  Later Protestants slowly parsed this tension by reemphasizing classic 
Protestant themes of the equality of men and women in Christ, and of their respective 
vocations before God.  
Since the early 1960s, American reformers have taken the lead in pressing the 
Enlightenment contractarian model of marriage to the more radical conclusions that 
Mill and others had intimated.  The same Enlightenment ideals of liberty and equality, 
which had earlier driven reforms of traditional marriage laws, have come to be used to 
reject these laws altogether.  The traditional Christian ideal of marriage as a 
permanent spiritual union designed for the sake of mutual love, procreation, and 
protection is slowly giving way to a new reality of marriage as a terminal sexual 
contract designed for the gratification of the individual parties.   
Today, John Stuart Mill's contractual ideal of marriage as "a private, bargained-
for exchange between husband and wife about all their rights, goods, and interests" 
has become a legal reality in America.  The strong presumption today is that adult 
parties have free entrance into marital contracts, free exercise of marital relationships, 
and free exit from marriages once their contractual obligations are discharged.  
Antenuptial, marital, and separation contracts that allow parties to define their own 
rights and duties within the marital estate and thereafter have gained increasing 
acceptance.  Implied marital contracts are imputed to longstanding lovers. Surrogacy 
contracts are executed for the rental of wombs.  Medical contracts are executed for the 
abortion of fetuses.  Traditional requirements of parental consent, peer witness, church 
consecration, or civil registration for all these contracts have largely disappeared.  No-
fault divorce statutes have reduced the divorce proceeding to an expensive formality.  
Lump sum property exchanges now often substitute for alimony.  Parties are still 
bound to continue to support their minor children, within and without marriage.  But this 
merely expresses another contractual principle--that parties respect the reliance and 
expectation interests of their children, who are third party beneficiaries of their marital 
or sexual contracts.   
But today, James Fitzjames Stephen's warning that undue contractualization of 
marriage will bring ruin to many women and children has also become a social reality 
in America.  Premarital, marital, separation, and divorce contracts too often are not 
arms-length transactions, and too often are not driven by rational calculus alone.  In 
the heady romance of budding nuptials, parties are often blind to the full consequences 
of their bargain.  In the emotional anguish of separation and divorce, parties can be 
driven more by the desire for short-term relief from the other spouse than by the 
concern for their long-term welfare or that of their children.  The economically stronger 
and more calculating spouse triumphs in these contexts.  And in the majority of cases 
today, that party is still the man--despite the loud egalitarian rhetoric to the contrary.   
"Underneath the mantle of equality that has been draped over the ongoing 
family, the state of nature flourishes," Mary Ann Glendon writes.  In this state of nature, 
freedom and privacy reign supreme.  But married life is becoming increasingly "brutish, 
nasty, and short"--with women and children bearing the primary costs.  Recall the 
familiar statistics: In the 1990s, a quarter of all pregnancies are aborted.  A third of all 
children are born to single mothers.  One half of all marriages end in divorce.  Two 
thirds of all black children are without regular fathers.  The number of "no parent" 
households doubles each year.  The number of "lost children" in America is more than 
fifteen million.  The greater the repeal of regulation of marriage for the sake of marital 
freedom and sexual privacy, the greater the threat to real freedom for women and 
children.  The very contractarian gospel that first promised salvation from the abuses 
of earlier Christian models of marriage and headship now threatens with even graver 
abuse.   
 
 
Lessons from the Tradition 
What is the way out of this dilemma?  There have been, and must be, many 
responses.  Mine is the expected response of an historian: "Back to the sources!"--but 
now newly enlightened.  The achievements of the Enlightenment in reforming the 
theology and law of marriage cannot be lost on us.  It took the contractual radicalism of 
Mill and his contemporaries to force the Western tradition to reform itself--to grant 
greater respect to the rights of women and children, to break the monopoly and 
monotony of outmoded moral and religious forms and forums respecting sexuality, 
marriage, and the family, to purge the excesses born of traditional understandings of 
male headship.  Some religious traditions may have retrieved or conceived their own 
resources to achieve these reforms, but it was the Enlightenment critique that forced 
these traditions to reform themselves and the state to reform its laws.  This was no 
small achievement.  
Just as the Enlightenment tradition still has much to teach us today, so do the 
earlier Protestant traditions.  Protestants have seen that marriages are at once natural, 
spiritual, social, and contractual units; that in order to survive and flourish, this 
institution must be governed both externally by legal authorities and internally by moral 
authorities.  Protestants have seen that the household is an inherently communal 
enterprise, in which marital couples, magistrates, and ministers must all inevitably 
cooperate to achieve the marital goods of mutual love, mutual procreation, and mutual 
protection of a person from sexual sin.   
One modern lesson in this is that we must resist the temptation to reduce 
marriage to a single perspective or to single authority.  A single perspective on 
marriage--whether religious, social, or contractual--does not capture the full nuance of 
marriage.  A single authority over marriage--whether the church, state, or 
paterfamilias--is not fully competent to govern all marital questions.   Marriage 
demands multiple perspectives and multiple authorities to be understood and governed 
adequately.   
A second lesson is that we must resist looking to the state alone for the sources 
of our marriage law.  American religious communities need to think much more 
seriously about restoring and reforming their own bodies of religious law on marriage, 
divorce, and sexuality, instead of simply acquiescing in state laws.  American states, in 
turn, must think more seriously about granting greater deference to the marital laws 
and customs of legitimate religious and cultural groups, with the state setting only 
minimum conditions to facilitate such unions and criminal law limits against abuses of 
wives and children.  The introduction of such legal pluralism might well lead some 
Christian, Jewish, Muslim, and other religious groups to reinstitute traditional forms of 
headship within the household.  American Baptist churches have made headlines of 
late by announcing such a position.  But if a religious community mandates responsible 
male -- or female -- headship as a condition for voluntary membership in the religious 
community, or of holding distinctive offices or powers within it, a state that respects 
religious freedom ultimately has little constitutional ground to object.  So long as 
membership in such religious communities, and their constituent household units, 
remains voluntary, and parties commit no threats or violence to life and limb to their 
members, the rights of the religious group to define its idea marital forms must trump. 
A promising recent development, which builds on the lessons of both the 
Protestant and Enlightenment traditions, is the rise of covenant marriage laws.  Such 
laws were first enacted in Louisiana in 1997, and are now under consideration in 
several other states.  At the time of their marital formation, couples may choose either 
a traditional contract marriage with attendant rights to no-fault divorce, or a covenant 
marriage, with more stringent formation and dissolution rules.  In forming a covenant 
marriage, the parties must receive detailed counseling from a licensed therapist or 
religious official, read the entire covenant marriage statute, and then swear an oath, 
pledging "full knowledge of the nature, purposes, and responsibilities of marriage" and 
promising "to love, honor, and care for one another as husband and wife for the rest of 
[their] lives."  Divorce is allowed such covenanted couples only on proof of adultery, 
capital felony, malicious desertion or separation for more than a year, and/or physical 
or sexual abuse of the spouse or one of the children.  Formal separation is allowed on 
any of these grounds, as well as on proof of habitual intemperance, cruel treatment, or 
outrages of the other spouse.   
This is a cleverly drawn statute that seeks to respect both the inherent virtues of 
contractual calculus, emphasized by the Enlightenment tradition, and the inherent 
goods of marital union, emphasized by the Protestant tradition.  The statute has been 
attacked, predictably, as an encroachment on sexual freedom and the rights of women 
and children, as a "Trojan horse" to smuggle biblical principles into American law, and 
as a throwback to the days of staged and spurious charges of marital infidelity which 
"no fault" statutes sought to overcome.  But, given the neutral language of the statute 
and its explicit protections of both voluntary entrance and involuntary exit from the 
covenant union, such objections are largely inapt.  The statute should help to inject 
both a greater level of realism into the heady romance of prospective couples and a 
greater level of rigor into the state's law of marriage formation and dissolution. 
The stronger objection to the Louisiana statute is not that it jeopardizes liberty 
but that it trivializes covenant.  The statute effectively reduces "covenant" to a super 
marriage contract between the husband and wife alone.  Historically, however, 
marriage covenants involved parents, peers, ministers, and magistrates as well, who 
served at least as checks on each other and the prospective couple, if not as 
representatives of God in the covenant formation.  Indeed, according to classic 
Protestant theology, the couple's parents, as God's bishops for children, gave their 
consent to the union.  Two parties, as God's priests to their peers, served as witnesses 
to the marriage.  The minister, holding God's spiritual power of the Word, blessed the 
couple and admonished them in their spiritual duties.  The magistrate, holding God's 
temporal power of the sword, registered the parties and their properties and ensured 
the legality of their union.  These four parties represented different dimensions of 
God's involvement in the marriage covenant, and were thus essential to the legitimacy 
of the marriage covenant itself.The Louisiana law replaces all four of these parties with 
a licensed marriage counsellor.  Moreover, the Louisiana law leaves it to the state to 
decide the terms of the marital covenant, the credentials of the marriage counsellor, 
the contents of the marriage oath.  Historically, however, churches and synagogues 
defined these matters for themselves, without much state interference.  Perhaps this 
covenant statute will be the first step toward a more embracive legal pluralism -- that 
respects the rights of individuals and religious groups to devise their own institutions of 
liberty and authority, equality and headship. 
 
